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COMMONSENSE AXIOMATIZATIONS FOR 
LOGIC PROGRAMS 
ALLEN VAN GELDER AND JOHN S. SCHLIPF* 
D Various semantics for logic programs with negation are described in terms 
of a dualized program together with additional axioms, some of which are 
second-order formulas. The semantics of Clark, Fitting, and Kunen are 
characterized in this framework, and a finite first-order presentation of 
Kunen’s semantics is described. A new axiom to represent “commonsense” 
reasoning is proposed for logic programs. It is shown that the well-founded 
semantics and stable models are definable with this axiom. The roles 
of domain augmentation and domain closure are examined. A “domain 
foundation” axiom is proposed to replace the domain closure axiom. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although the semantics of Horn logic programs is standard, as given in the seminal 
work of van Emden and Kowalski [47], there is presently no universally accepted 
semantics for logic programs with negation. The first purpose of this paper is to 
describe various existing proposals using a common framework of classical (two- 
valued) logic, thereby to delineate their differences more clearly. A second purpose 
is to explore the effects of various constraints on the universe (or domain) of 
interpretation on the logical consequences of the program. 
Our approach is to identify the program’s “declarative semantics” with the 
logical consequences of the rules in the program, together with various additional 
axioms. Various sets of additional axioms give rise to various semantics. We avoid 
the use of procedural definitions and nonstandard logics; in some cases we use 
second-order formulas, since they can be very useful in distinguishing concepts. 
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We introduce a new form of commonsense axiom for logic programs and show 
its relationship to the recently proposed semantics based on stable models and 
well-founded models. We shall discuss and compare the earlier semantics proposed 
by Clark 191, Fitting [ 111, and Kunen [ 191, as well as the more recent ones identified 
with stable models [12] and well-founded models [50]. 
For the semantics of logic programs it is traditional to restrict attention to 
Herbrand models. For a definite (Horn, or negation-free) logic program, one 
makes the same inferences by restricting attention to Herbrand models as one 
would by considering all models (as in first-order logic). However, for logic 
programs with negation this restriction does affect the resulting inferences and 
may lead to a number of unnatural features. For example, in modularized software, 
the interpretation of the rules in a module should not exclude the possibility of 
objects not known to the module. Some researchers have suggested weakening 
this domain assumption. In this paper we shall consider various weaker forms of 
that domain assumption, and we shall investigate how the choice of domain 
assumption affects the axiomatization of logic programming semantics described 
above. 
1. I. Related Work 
It has long been accepted that a logic program, particularly one with negative 
subgoals, carries a certain amount of implicit information. Clark was the first to 
formalize a method to make this implicit content explicit, by defining a completed 
logic program to be associated with the original [9]. Reiter’s closed world assumption 
is somewhat related [37]. Independently, McCarthy proposed the concept of 
circumscription to capture the implicit “commonsense” element in any first-order 
sentence (not necessarily a logic program) that was intended roughly as a state- 
ment of “knowledge about the world” [28, 291. Whereas Clark remained within a 
first-order framework, McCarthy used a second-order formula. To a large extent, 
subsequent research has refined one of these fundamental approaches in an 
attempt to cure various perceived problems in circumscription [22, 31, 24, 23, 17, 
181 or program completion [4.5, 11, 19, 26, 46, 201. 
Stratified semantics [3,481 and its generalizations, such as stable models [12] and 
well-founded semantics [50], constitute a vein that has seen considerable recent 
activity [34, 8, 15, 35, 25, 38, 44, 49, 33, 42, 40, 43, 61. One of the main motivations 
for this type of semantics is that complements of many inductive definitions have 
their natural expression, a feature lacking in all of the program completion 
approaches. Example 5.1 illustrates this idea with the complement of transitive 
closure of a directed graph. 
Two other active areas deserve mention, although they are not closely related to 
the issues studied in this paper. One is the study of logic programs without function 
symbols, often called deductive databases 17, 13, 14, 1, 16, 10, 21, 151. Another is 
the study of disjunctive logic programs [30, 41, 36, 39, 331. 
1.2. Summary of Results 
In Section 5 we propose a new second-order axiom that formalizes “commonsense” 
differently from traditional circumscription. Rather than minimality, it addresses 
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lack of support. One form of this axiom leads to stable models; another leads to 
well-founded models. 
In Section 6 we show that certain infinite sets of axioms that are customarily 
used to constrain the universes of models have finite presentations, a fact that may 
facilitate implementations and automated proofs of properties. 
Stable and well-founded models, as presented in previous literature, are always 
defined given fixed universes, almost always Herbrand universes. Thus, obtaining 
either stable or well-founded models requires an additional axiom to constrain the 
universe (or domain) of interpretation. One sufficient constraint is that the uni- 
verse be (an isomorphic copy of) the Herbrand universe. As noted above, in many 
settings such a constraint is unnatural. Therefore, an alternative is investigated in 
Section 7, which we call the domainfoundutiort axiom. This axiom does not specify 
any particular universe, though it specifies that some of the properties of the 
Herbrand universe hold. We show that the domain closure requirement can be 
“factored” into the domain foundation axiom and a first-order nameability axiom. 
Figure 1 (see Section 8) summarizes the relationships found among various 
axiomatizations studied in the paper. 
2. PRELIMINARIES AND TERMINOLOGY 
We assume familiarity with the common terminology of logic programming, but we 
review some specifics and describe our notation and basic definitions. 
2.1. Rule Format 
A Horn logic program may be thought of as a finite set of rules, exactly one for 
each predicate symbol, in the form 
qi(Zi) +- ~#+(j;,), i= l,...,n 
(CEA#, dca#, wrllsup) (WF-aug) 




(den, wrllsup) (WF-F’) 
I 
(disjomf , b&d) (Clark) 1 
FIGURE 1. Relationships among the semantics studied; those in the same box have the 
same logical consequences for first-order sentences in L,. All semantics include (P, @, CEA). 
An arrow A 4 B indicates that B's models are a subset of A’s, but not necessarily that B 
has greater expressive power. WF-aug abbreviates the augmented well-founded semantics 
(on L,) and WF-P denotes the well-founded semantics on L,. 
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where each .?i is a vector of distinct variables xi, XI?, . . . ; formula qiCQ, called the 
head of the rule, is an atomic formula; and c/&?J, called the body of the rule, 
is a positive, existential formula of first-order logic with equality, whose free vari- 
ables are exactly & That is, the rule body is built from atomic formulas (atoms) 
connected by logical and (&>, or ( V ), and existential quantifiers. The propositional 
constants true and false may also be used for rule bodies. The backwards implica- 
tion symbol (+) is conveniently read as “if.” Square brackets are sometimes used 
as well as parentheses to delimit scope. Should some predicate qi not otherwise 
appear in the head of a rule, we shall have the vacuous rule qi + false. The reason 
for this slightly unorthodox description will soon become evident. 
Definition 2.1. The rule bodies of a program may contain function symbols (of 
arity 2 1) and constant symbols. The set of all such symbols is called the 
functional vocabulary (or just “vocabulary”) of the program, denoted L,. Fre- 
quently, we shall consider functional vocabularies Li containing additional 
symbols not present in the program. Several symbols will require the vocabulary 
Li as a modifier (e.g., F, to be defined later). To avoid double subscripts, we just 
use the subscript of L on the other symbol (e.g., Fi instead of FL,). Also, the 
absence of a subscript indicates the symbol is associated with L,. 
Example 2.1. The following program defines e as a directed edge relation on three 
nodes, a, b, and c, and defines p as its transitive closure: 
P(X,Y) +e(X,y) V 32 [p(x,z)&p(z9y)l 
e(x,y) + [(x=a)&(y=b)] V [(x=b)&(y=a)] V [(x=c)&(y=c)] 
The functional vocabulary of the program is L, = (a, b, c). 
In deductive database settings e is called an extensional database predicate 
because it can be rewritten as a finite set of ground facts, e(a, b), e(b, a>, and 
e(c, c). In such settings, the rule for e is often regarded as part of the input, not 
part of the program. For this paper, the rule for e is part of the program, and 
indeed, every predicate must have exactly one rule in the program. 
There are several natural ways to extend the Horn rule format to introduce 
nonmonotonicity. We are primarily concerned with the extension to normal logic 
programs, in the terminology of Lloyd [26]. This extension permits rule bodies to be 
built from positive and negative literals (where Horn rules are limited to atoms, or 
positive literals), connected by “and, ” “or,” and existential quantifiers; essentially, 
only universal quantifiers are absent. A closely related extension, general logic 
programs, permits rule bodies to be any first-order formula. (Lloyd and Topor used 
the terms “generalized clause” and “extended clause” where we use “normal” and 
“general” [27].) A quite different road is taken with disjunctive logic programs, 
which permit the head of a rule to be a disjunction of atoms [30]. 
Although we shall transfomz a normal logic program into a form that contains 
first-order formulas, we wish to emphasize that the original program consists of 
normal rules only. 
2.2. Notational Conventions 
Some additional notational conventions follow. In all cases, when it is clear from 
the context, the symbols may represent vectors of the designated objects; e.g., 4 
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often represents a vector of formulas. R often represents a vector of predicate 
variables, etc. 
l Generic formulas are denoted by $,4. 
l Generic terms are s,f,u. 
l Generic n-ary function symbols (n 2 1) are f, g. 
l Generic constant symbols are a, b, c. 
l When the context makes it clear, ground (variable-free) terms are also 
written as a, b, c. 
l Variables (ranging over individuals) are u,. . . , z; free variables are local to 
individual formulas when vectors of formulas are present. 
l Predicate variubles of second-order formulas are written using uppercase 
letters R, . . . , 2. 
l Generic program predicates are denoted with q. 
l As usual, the symbols = and # are the logical symbols for true equality and 
inequality of elements of the universe. 
In program examples, any lowercase letter (or word) may represent a predicate or a 
function symbol, when the syntax dictates this meaning. We emphasize again that 
each relation symbol qi must appear in the head of a unique rule q&x) + c#+(x). 
Several notations that are introduced as they are needed are mentioned here for 
ease of cross reference. 
l The notation 9’ is defined in Definition 3.1. Here we emphasize that N is not 
a vector notation and is not an operator. 
l The immediate consequence operator T,p is introduced in Definition 3.4. 
l Functional vocabulary notation, including the avoidance of double subscript- 
ing, is discussed in Definition 2.1. 
l A unary predicate whose rule defines the Herbrand universe is denoted by 
h(x) and its rule body is &(x) (Definition 4.2). 
l The formula F(x, y> is used to define fimctionul edges (Definition 6.1). 
l The formula C&,,,(X) is used for the domain foundation axiom (Definition 7.2). 
To streamline notation when no confusion will arise, we may drop subscripts 
and omit arrows over vectors. For example, the n generic program rules may be 
abbreviated to 
By doing so we do not intend to limit the discussion to programs with a single 
unary predicate. Similarly, R normally denotes an n-vector of predicate variables, 
with each R, corresponding to qi in arity. 
Definition 2.2. It is necessary to have a concise notation for syntactic substitutions 
in formulas. If C#J(X) is a formula, then the notation 
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denotes the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of the predicate 
symbol qi by the formula & with appropriate unification. That is, if an 
occurrence of qi has as arguments the k-vector of terms t, then I+$ has k free 
variables y, and t&(t) is substituted for qi(t). In usage, +i will usually be a 
predicate variable, Ri, or a predicate constant true or false. 
As usual, if q is the vector (ql ,..., qn) we write 4[q/R] for 4[q,/R ,,..., 
q,/R,](x). Similarly 4 may denote a vector of formulas, each receiving the same 
substitution. 
As a final notational shorthand, we shall use set operations to abbreviate certain 
second-order formulas. A typical example is R c C#I to abbreviate Vx [R(x) + +(x)1, 
which in turn is really an abbreviation for 
3. DUALIZED PROGRAMS 
Clark introduced the idea of replacing an “if’ rule by its “if and only if’ 
counterpart. We introduce dualized rules and programs to achieve a somewhat 
weaker effect.’ The dualized program serves as a common point of departure for 
various semantics. Although the original program consists of normal rules only, i.e., 
rules whose bodies are existentially quantified conjunctions of literals, the dualized 
program may contain universal quantifiers and disjunctions. 
The first step of dualization is to replace each negative literal 7 q(t) in the rule 
body by q(t); ~(t = u) is replaced by t # u. Since 4 and # are regarded as new 
predicate symbols, this actually removes all negation from the program. We call q 
and = positive predicates and call 4 and # tilde predicates. The rules that result, 
denoted as a set by P, are called the positive rules. 
Definition 3.1. For any formula + in which negation is absent, the dual of ~JJ, 
denoted by $, is defined inductively. 
1. Atoms q(t) and g(t) are duals; (t = u) and (t #u> are duals; true and false 
are duals. 
2. The dual of ($8~ 4) is (4 V 4); the dual of (I) V 4) is ($& $)._ 
3. The dual of 3x 1,4(x> is Vx $6~); the dual of Vx I,!&> is 3x I)(X). 
The definition extends to all formulas by first pushing negations down to the 
atoms, then replacing 7 q by q, and finally applying the above definition to 
construct the dual. 
The tilde rule corresponding to positive rule q(x) t 4(x) is <LX) + 6(x>, 
where &x> is the dual formula of 4(x>. The set of tilde rules corresponding to 
P is denoted @. 
The tilde rule g(x) - + +(x1 can be thought of as the “only if” version of 
q(x) + 4(x). The initial form of the “only if’ rule is q(x) -P c+(x). However, its 
contrapositive form is 7 q(x) + 7 ~$4~1, which leads to the tilde rule by pushing 
down negations in the rule body and replacing negative literals by tilde atoms. 
‘“Doubled” programs used by other researchers are not related; they have a second copy of the 
same rules for bookkeeping purposes. 
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Example 3.1. The Horn program for transitive closure of Example 2.1 has the 
following tilde rules (note the universal quantifier): 
ii(x,y) +e’(x,y)&Vz [G(V) V@(&Y)l 
~(~,y)~[(~~a)V(~f~)l~[(~~~)~(Y~a)l~[(~~c)V(y~c)l 
Observe that the rule for ~3 is recursive with no base case. 
Traditionally in logic programming, distinct ground terms are assumed to name 
distinct objects. With ordinary definite clause programs (not involving = or #>, 
this assumption makes no difference in traditional semantics. Here, due to the 
introduction of universal quantifiers and the presence of # , it is important to rule 
out models in which syntactically different terms collapse to the same interpreted 
object. The standard way to do this is to append the Clark equality theory, which 
forces syntactically different variable-free terms to be interpreted as different 
objects 19, 4, 19, 261. This is achieved by introducing an infinite recursive set of 
first-order sentences, which depend on the functional vocabulary of the program. 
They are often called the Clark equality axioms (CEA) or the equality freeness 
axioms. 
Definition 3.2. The Clark equality axioms (CEA) for a given functional vocabulary 
L consist of the following inequalities. For simplicity of presentation, we give 
them for a vocabulary that contains just one constant a, one unary function g, 
and one binary function symbol f. 
1. The global injectiuity constraint requires all functions to be injective (l-1) and 
to have disjoint ranges, where constants are treated as 0-ary functions: 
VXIX2 [XI +x2 + (d-4 %x2>>] 
VXIY,X,Y, [(XI +x2 VYl fY2) +f(xI?YI) +f(x,?Y*)l 
vx [g(x) +a1 
v-v LO Y> +a1 
VW [fG,Y) +&WI 
For a finite vocabulary, this constraint consists of a finite number of axioms. 
2. The acyclic@ constraint consists of axioms that prevent any term being equal 
to a proper subterm of itself. This constraint is usually presented as an 
infinite set of inequalities, even for finite vocabularies [9, 261: 
vx 1x # g(x)1 vxy [X+f(X,Y)&x+f(Y,x)l 
vx [x +g(g(x))l vxy [X#f(g(x),Y)&x#f(Y,g(x))l 
vxy [Xfg(f(X,Y))&x#g(f(Y,x))l VW [X#f(f(X,Y),z)&X#f(f(Y,X),Z) 
&x#f(z,f(x,Y>)&x#f(z,f(Y,x))l 
It will be instructive later (Section 6) to study a finite presentation of the 
acyclicity constraint. 
The generalization to arbitrary vocabularies should be obvious. Unmodified, the 
abbreviation CEA denotes the set of Clark equality axioms for L,, the func- 
168 A. VAN GELDER AND J. S. SCHLIPF 
tional vocabulary of the program under consideration. We shall have occasion to 
phrase CEA using different vocabularies; for L, we use CEA#; for L .+ , CEA * ; 
for L,, CEA,; etc. 
Note that if L, and L, are two vocabularies whose Clark equality axioms are 
CEA, and CEA,, respectively, then L, c L, if and only if CEA, L CEA,. 
Definition 3.3. The_ dualized program associated with a given logic program P is 
denoted by (P,P,CEA); it is the set of formulas consisting of the positive and 
tilde rules, together with the Clark equality axioms. 
Example 3.2. The original rules are 
P(X) +e(x)&3yd(x7y) 
d(x,y) + +=Y) 
e(x) * (x=a) 
Intuitively, d is intended to express the property that x and y are distinct. The 
dualized program consists of 
P(X) +e(-W3yd(x,y) 
d(x,y) + (x+Y) 
e(x) + (x=a) 
I?(x) +e-(x) V@(X,Y) 
4&Y) * (x=y) 
Z(x) t- (x #a) 
plus CEA. 
If the dualized program is interpreted in a universe of one element, then j(a) 
must be true; whereas if it is interpreted in a larger universe, then p(a) must 
be true. Note that neither p(a) nor @(a) is a logical consequence of the dualized 
program. This program is discussed further in later examples. 
Although all rule bodies are positive formulas in the dualized program, <P,P) is 
not generally a Horn program due to the presence of universal quantification. 
However, it is an inductive system as studied by Moschovakis 1321. The familiar 
immediate consequence operator associated with the dualized program may be 
defined using the formula named Tp~ below. Since Tpp is defined on the dualized 
program, it is the analogue of Fitting’s three-valued immediate consequence 
operator @,, [ll], but stated in the language of dualized programs. We discuss 
Fitting’s semantics in Section 4. With some abuse of notation we use the same 
symbol for the operator as for its defining formula. This operator is monotonic and 
has a least fixpoint, denoted by T& in any structure for (P, P, CEA). 
Definition 3.4. Let P be a program given by the rules q(x) + $(x1, where q is an 
n-vector of predicate symbols. [Recall that x is a vector (xi,. . . , xn> of vectors of 
individual variable?; each xi has the arity of qi.l Let y have the same arities as 
x, and let R and R (n-vectors of predicate variables) have the same arities as q. 
COMMONSENSE AXIOMATGTATIONS 169 
Then, 
T,p(R,~)(~,y)~~(d[q/R,~/~](x),~[q/R,q’/R](Y)) 
that is, the vector of second-order formulas 
~,[q/~?U~](r1) 
The immediate consequence operator for (P, B> is defined by this formula in the 
obvious way: For input relations (r, r’> of the same arities as q over some 
structure, the output of T,+ (viewed as an operator) is the 2n-vector of relations, 
the sets-of all tuples that satisfy &,. . . , &,, &, . . . , & when R are interpreted by 
r and R are interpreted by r”. 
Example 3.3. If P is the transitive closure program of Example 2.1, whose dualized 
rules were shown in Example 3.1, then the formula TPp is built as follows. With 
some renaming of free variables, the body of the rule for p is 
4,(x:,.x12) =e(x:,x:) V 32 [p(x~,z)&~(z,x:)] 
ThUS, 
~,[p/Rl,e/R2,~/R,,i/R?](x~?~~) 
=&(x:,x:) v 3~ [R,(x:,z)&R,(z,.+] 
Repeating this substitution for C#J~ (the body of the rule for e), &, and &, we 
obtain 
T&r, R,, $7 &)( x:,x:,x:,x~,Y:,Y:,Y~,Y~) 
I R&,x,2) v 3~ [R,(x:>z)&R,(z~:)] 
[(x;=u)&(x;=b)] V[(x:=b)&(X:=a)] v[(x;=c)&(x;=c)] 
= 
&(Y:,Y12)&~z [&(YLZ> vfil(zTY:)] 
,[(Y:#a)v(y:#b)l~[(Y:+b)v(Y,2f~)l&[(Y:#c)V(Y:+c)l 
The free variables of each formula have the same name except for superscripts. We 
hope this example illustrates our motivation to streamline the notation! 
The associated immediate consequence operator transforms a 4-vector of bin- 
ary relations into another 4-vector of binary relations. To evaluate the oper- 
ator, interpret CR,, R2,d,, Z?,) as the input 4-vector. These 4-vectors intuitively 
correspond to (p, e, 3, e’). 
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4. PROGRAM COMPLETION SEMANTICS 
From the dualized program we can re-establish the connection between duals and 
negation with the aid of two additional first-order axioms. 
Definition 4.1. The disjointness and totality axioms are 
disjointgf 7% [q(x)&@(x)] 
=(ql-lG=IZr) 
total*fVx [q(x) V+(x)] 
We remind the reader that the axioms are presented in abbreviated form 
for programs with several predicates; the unabbreviated forms would have the 
appropriate conjunctions and subscripts. 
Clark proposed a semantics based on the completed program, which in our 
notation adds disjoint and total to the dualized program: 
comp( P) dzf (P, @, CEA, disjoint, total) 
Sentences that are logical consequences of the completed program are regarded as 
true. For query-answering purposes, associate @ with 7 q. Recall that a formula is 
a logical consequence of a set of axioms if and only if it is true in all models of 
those axioms (not just Herbrand models). 
One problem with the completed program is that it might be inconsistent. While 
the examples of this phenomenon, such as p t 7 p, might appear silly as pro- 
grams, inconsistency can arise in quite reasonable programs. For this single rule, 
the dualized rules are p +$ and p +p. The dualized program has two models, but 
comp(P> is inconsistent. 
However, it is straightforward to show that disjoint can cause inconsistency only 
in conjunction with total; that is, an easy induction argument shows that the least 
fixpoint of Tpp on any structure that satisfies CEA is a model of (P, b, CEA, disjoint). 
Fitting and Kunen considered variations of program completion that essentially 
discarded total, although their work was presented in terms of three-valued logic. 
With total gone, a simple argument shows that the addition of disjoint to the 
dualized program does not constrain the logical consequences: The least fixpoint of 
Tpp on the Herbrand universe is always a model of the dualized program that 
satisfies disjoint. So disjoint may be ignored also, and we are back to the dualized 
program (P, $, CEA). 
It is easy to see that T,p as an operator corresponds to Fitting’s three-valued 
immediate consequence operator QP with just a change of terminology. Just 
associate atoms g here with negative literals 7 q, and observe that 7 q belongs to 
the output of Qp, just when 4’ belongs to the output of T,p. There are two 
important differences between the Fitting and Kunen semantics, one of which is 
quite subtle. 
4.1. Domain Closure Axioms 
The Fitting semantics essentially limits the domain of interpretation to the Herbrand 
universe; it specifies that the true facts are precisely those in Tgp, the least fixpoint 
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of the immediate consequence operator, on that universe [ill. We now describe 
this semantics in terms of logical consequences of a second-order formula. 
Membership in the Herbrand universe can be defined inductively. For each 
finite functional vocabulary L there is a rule h(x) + 4,(x) whose least fixpoint 
defines the Herbrand universe (on structures that satisfy CEA, up to isomorphism). 
Definition 4.2. The construction of #+, depends on the set of symbols of L, but is 
purely mechanical. For example, if the program has just a constant a, a unary 
function g, and binary function f: 
6z(xPf(X=a) ” 3Y [(x=g(y))&h(y)l 
“3YZ [(x=f(Y,z))&h(Y)&h(z)l 
As is well known, the inductive closure of h(x) + &(x1 is not first-order 
definable, but is expressed by the second-order formula 
VX [h(x) c, &y(X)]&VR [(&[h/R] CR) -+h CR] 
The first conjunct states that h is a fixpoint, and the second conjunct (the 
second-order part of the formula) constrains h to be contained in any fixpoint. 
The goal of a domain closure axiom is to force any model of the above rule to 
make h true for the whole universe. First, notice that the weaker requirement hat 
the universe be a tixpoint of the rule is expressed by Vx 4,[h/truel(x), which 
axiom is considered later under the name &a,. However, to require that the 
universe be the least fixpoint requires a second-order axiom, such as the following. 
Definition 4.3. With & as in Definition 4.2, for a given functional vocabulary L, 
the domain closure axiom is 
dcuefVR [(+,[h/R] GR) +VyR(y)] 
This axiom states that no proper subset of the universe both contains (the 
interpretations of) the constant symbols and is closed under (the interpretations 
of) the function symbols of L. 
Recall that the operator Tpp is the analogue of Fitting’s mP operator. It follows 
that the Fitting semantics can be defined as the logical consequences of the 
dualized program conjoined with the above domain closure axiom: (P, 6, CEA, dcu). 
4.2. Kunen’s Logical Consequence Semantics 
Kunen has also proposed a semantics based on Fitting’s QP operator (T,p in this 
paper’s notation) [19]. The well-recognized difference between the Fitting and 
Kunen semantics is that Fitting uses TFp, the least fixpoint, whereas Kunen uses 
T+. There is another subtle difference: Kunen requires the logic program to be 
expressed in a vocabulary L, with a countably infinite set of function symbols 
of each arity. This has the effect of preventing the (finite) definition of domain 
closure! 
The infinite set of function symbols in L * can be introduced by using CEA * ; an 
extended set of equality axioms that mentions these function symbols as well as 
those that occur in the program. The Kunen semantics is defined as the logical 
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consequences of (P,P, CEA*). One of Kunen’s main theorems [19, Theorem 6.31 
states that this semantics corresponds to T;“p (which may not be a fixpoint!) on the 
Herbrand universe of L .+ : 
Theorem 4.1 (Kunen). Let P,P,T,p, L *, and CZSI * be as defined above, and let Z 
be the Herbrand interpretation in which the universe is generated by L .+ and the 
relations are specified by Tp”. Then sentence I/I is a logical consequence of 
(P, P, CEA * > if and only if $ evaluates to true in I. 
The next example [50] shows that the Fitting and Kunen semantics are actually 
incomparable; neither is contained in the other. 
fiample 4.1. Recall the dualized program of Example 3.2: 
P(X) +e(x)&3yd(x,y) 
d(x,y) + (x +Y) 
e(x) +- (x=a) 
8(x) +Z(x> VVY&Y) 
4&Y) + (x=y) 
e-(x> * (x#a) 
plus CEA. First, note that neither p(a) nor @(a> is a logical consequence of 
(P,F, CEA). The Fitting semantics and Kunen semantics further constrain the 
models in different ways, leading to different results. 
The atom B(a) is true in all Herbrand models, hence is true in the Fitting 
semantics, as it is a logical consequence of (P, P, CEA, dca). However, p(a) is true 
in all models on infinite universes, hence is true in Kunen semantics, as it is a 
logical consequence of (P,@, CEA*). As both semantics respect disjoint, they are 
incomparable on this program. 
Finally, since (P, P, CEA) is a subset of both (P, P, CEA, dca) and (P, P, CEA * 1, 
its set of consequences is (always) a subset of sets of consequences of both the 
preceding two and (in this case) is a proper subset of them both. 
It is not always clear whether requiring the program to be interpreted in a 
universe with infinitely many “unknown” objects agrees with the user’s intentions. 
This question is discussed in Section 7. 
4.3. A Limitation of Program Completion 
None of the program completion semantics captures the complement of an 
inductive closure, even over a finite set, in a natural way. The well-worn example 
is the complement of transitive closure on a finite directed graph [48, 20, 501, as 
may be seen from Example 3.1. This fact is perhaps the primary motivation for 
exploring other semantics. We examine some recent proposals in Section 5. 
5. A “COMMONSENSE” AXIOM 
McCarthy observed that in everyday “commonsense” reasoning, people treat a 
statement as false if there is no foundation for believing it to be true [28]. Thus 
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from the rule “healthy birds can fly, except penguins” and the fact “Tweety is a 
healthy bird,” the commonsense conclusion is that Tweety can fly, because there is 
no reason to believe that Tweety is a penguin. He formalized this practice by adding 
an axiom requiring models to be minimal with respect to certain predicates. 
For logic programs, we propose a different axiom, one that goes more directly to 
the point that there is “no reason to believe” something. Informally, a set of facts 
that we have “no reason to believe” is called unsupported. We intend to accept 
models only if they satisfy a well-supported set axiom, which requires all sets of 
unsupported facts about the original predicates of the program to have dualized 
facts that are true in the model. That is, if p(a) is in an unsupported set, then the 
well-supported set axiom requires that jXa) must be in the model.. This is the 
“commonsense” axiom that we believe captures the spirit of circumscription more 
accurately than the usual relation-minimization axioms. Dung has recently made a 
similar proposal, limited to Herbrand models [lOa]. 
5.1. Unsupported Set Axiom 
The unsupported set axiom is essentially a generalization of the notion of unfounded 
set [50] to arbitrary domains. The reader is advised to study the example that 
follows, to see the motivation and get a feeling for how the definition works. 
Various technical meanings for “supported” and “unsupported” appear in the 
literature; care must be taken not to confuse them with the one that follows. 
Definition 5.1. Let P be a given logic program with generic rule q(x) + c#h). The 
unsupported set axiom for U with respect to S and s’ is 
unsup(U,S,S)dzfUCTC[q/S,c.j/(SV U)] 
Here we use the substitution notation from Section 2.2; an occurrence g(t) is 
replaced by (S(t) v U(t)), where t is a vector of terms. Observe that unsup 
depends implicitly on P through q, 4, and 4. Intuitively, given a model with 
(S, S) true, unsup, states that U is able to “rederive itself’ as additional tilde 
atoms. 
Example 5.1. The dualized transitive closure program of Example 3.1 was 
P(X,Y) +e(x,y) V 32 [p(w)&~(z,y)l 
e(x,y) -((x=a)&(y=b)) V((x=b)&(y=a)) V((x=c)&(Y=c)) 
@(X,Y) -+e’(x,y)&Vz [Ij;(-w) “iqGY)l 
As mentioned before, the rule for ~5 is recursive with no base case; consequently, 
no facts for 3 can be derived. However, (a, c) and (b, c>, among other tuples, are in 
the complement of the transitive closure of e. 
Let us use the notation q = (p, e), C/J = (fPT &,>, and U = CL&U,> to be specific. 
Let the universe be (a, b, c, a#). Only one disjoint pair of relations (e,,, e’,) on this 
universe satisfies the rules for e and e’, namely, those that interpret 4e,(x,y) and 
&,(x, y), respectively. 
Consider (an interpretation for) U whose components are defined by UP = 
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Ku, ~>,(a, a,>,(b, c),(b, a,>) and U, = 0. Then 
Of course, the second conjunct is satisfied trivially. The first conjunct written in 
more detail becomes 
This conjunct also is true for UP are given. Thus the unsupported set axiom, 
unsupW,(0, e,), (0, &,)I, is satisfied by U = CUP, 0). By monotonicity of (4, +), 
unsupW, S, $1 holds for any (S, $1 that contains (e,, e’,,). 
Note that UP is contained in the complement of the transitive closure of e in 
the given universe. If UP were any smaller, and nonempty, the axiom would not 
hold. However, it could be enlarged to the entire complement of the transitive 
closure and the axiom would hold, and this is true for all universes that contain 
the Herbrand universe. (View a, as a generic extra term, and the details are 
straightforward.) 
It is important that unsup(U,(0, e,), (0, t?,)) holds only for UP that are con- 
tained in the complement of the transitive closure. To see that this is indeed the 
case, first note that UP must be a subset of 5, for the axiom to have a chance, so 
assume this is the case. Now if (si, t) E UP and is in the transitive closure, there is 
an edge (sl, s2) that is part of a simple path of length it > 1 from s1 to t. Thus 
U,(s,, s,> must be false, and it is necessary that U,(s,, t) be true for the axiom to 
hold. But there is a path from s2 to t of length n - 1, so there is an edge (s2, SJ 
that forces U,(s,, t) to be true, and so on. Eventually, (sn, t) is forced to be in UP, 
but is also an edge, contradicting the assumption that UP is contained in e’,. 
In summary, the complement of the transitive closure is the maximum 
unsupported set with respect to (e,, e’,). 
The observation in the previous example can be generalized to all positive 
existential inductive definitions (Horn programs), as well as to stratified programs. 
The arguments are omitted, as they have been given elsewhere in connection with 
the well-founded semantics [50, Theorems 3.7 and 6.11. Although those proofs were 
phrased in terms of unfounded sets, rather than unsupported sets, no new ideas 
are involved. The connection between unsupported sets and unfounded sets is 
discussed next. 
Unfounded sets were defined as part of the well-founded semantics [50]. They 
were defined within the Herbrand universe, although the definition can be applied 
in other universes. [In this section a, b, and c will denote ground (variable-free) 
terms, not necessarily constant symbols.] The definition is given here in terms of 
the dualized program. The cited paper should be consulted for additional details 
and motivation. The relationship to unsupported sets is illustrated in the lemma 
that follows the definitions. 
Definition 5.2. Without loss of generality, we assume that each rule body is in the 
form 
+i(x)‘f V 3Yj+Ljk(n,Yj) 
i 
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where the Lj, are atoms. A vector of relations vi, 1 I i 5 n, is an unfounded set 
with respect to (S, $> if for each ground Herbrand rule instantiation 
4i(U) = V $Ljk(aTbj) 
i 
such that a E 4, for each disjunct j there is a so-called witness of unusability for 
some Ljk(a, b,) with one of these properties, where q,,, denotes the predicate 
symbol of Lj, and c abbreviates (a, bj): 
1. If Ljk(u, b,) is the positive atom q,(c) and c E s,, then q,(c) is a witness of 
unusability; similarly, if Ljk(u, bj) is the tilde atom &Cc) and c E S,, then 
q,(c) is a witness of unusability. 
2. If Ljk(u, bj) is the positive atom q,(c) and c E U,, then q,(c) is a witness of 
unusability. 
Intuitively, for fixed i and u, the witnesses of unusability for all j collectively 
demonstrate that q,(u) cannot be the first atom in U to be derived starting from 
(S, S). 
The mapping IkS, $> is defined by 
qs,s)~f{gi( )Ia a E q such that U is unfounded w.r.t. (S, 3)) 
Note that this maps a pair of vectors of rel_ations into a vector of tilde relations. 
The well-founded_ transformation WCS, S) combines the positive immediate 
consequences with U, 
and its least fixpoint gives the well-founded dualized model [50]. 
Observe that, if U is unfounded w.r.t. (S, s>, then no element of U can be the 
first element of U to be derived in a positive relation as long as the positive and 
tilde relations that represent the current “set of beliefs” remain disjoint and are 
supersets of (S, S>. Furthermore, this remains true even after the tuples of U are 
added to the tilde relations. In this sense, it is “safe” to put U’s tuples in the tilde 
relations. 
What is called the well-founded partial model in the original nomenclature is 
called the well-founded dualized model here because it is actually a two-valued 
model of the dualized program. However, it may not satisfy the totality axiom, total. 
One theorem we shall use is that stable models are precisely the fixpoints of W that 
do satisfy total [50, Theorem 5.41. 
The next lemma shows that unsupported sets are essentially a generalization of 
unfounded sets to arbitrary domains. 
Lemma 5.1. Let P be a logic program and let L be a functional vocabulary containing 
at least the functional vocabulary of P. Define CEA and dcu with respect to L. In 
structures sutisfiing CEA and dcu (essentially the Herbrund universe for L), U is an 
unfounded set-with respect to (S, S> if and only if U is an unsupported set with 
respect to (S, 9. 
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PROOF. This is a matter of checking the definitions. Let a rule body be 
4i(r) = V 3Yj$Ljk(x~Yj) 
i 
Its dual is 
$i(X) = FvYj V ijk(X~Yjl 
k 
Suppose U is unfounded. The domain closure axiom forces V?j in C& to range only 
over ground Herbrand terms. For x = a and yj = bj, the witness of unusability 
causes some Lp[q/&!?, @/(S V U)] to evaluate to true, and there is one witness for 
each conjunct j. 
Suppose U is unsupported. Then for each qi(a) E U, the body &(a) must be 
true,_ so each conjunct j must be true, so for all terms bj some literal Lj,[q/S, 
@/(S V U)l(a, bj) must be true. Whichever literal is true is the witness of unusabil- 
ity. For example, if the literal is g,(c) and c E U,, it meets condition 2; other cases 
meet condition 1. q 
Several different fixpoint constructions of the well-founded semantics have 
appeared in the literature. Przymusinski has given one that involves the greatest 
flxpoint of an operator based on 4 [35] and has shown (see Theorem 3.2 there) that 
it defines the well-founded semantics. Although the notation is rather different, we 
shall use essentially the same idea to characterize the greatest unsupported set. 
Greatest fixpoints are not as widely used as least fixpoints. We shall use the 
following standard properties that are analogs of least tixpoint properties [32, 21: 
Fact A. A monotone operator on a lattice has a greatest fixpoint. 
Fact B. The greatest hxpoint of a universally quantified positive induction (i.e., the 
carrier appears only positively, and not under an existential quantifier) closes 
within w stages. 
Fact C. If G is the greatest fixpoint of the monotonic transformation T, where 
“ c ” is the partial order on the lattice, and R 5 T(R), then R c G. 
Recall that a_ set U is unsupported with respect to S and s if it satisfies 
U G +[q/S, g/(S v U)] (Definition 5.1). Now add to the language a vector u 
of extra predicates for the sets U and consider the formula Cp[q, G/c@ V u>l. 
By construction, u occurs only positively in this formula. Moreover, the formula 
has only universal quantification (if any), because 4, as a normal rule body, may 
contain only existential quantification. 
Hence, for any structure IJI, with fixed interpretations (S, s> of (q, $, there is a 
greatest fixed point G of the formula;_ that is, G_ is the greatest set (vector of 
relations, actually) U that satisfies U = +[q/S, G/(S V WI. 
Lemma 5.2. The greatest @point G just described is the union of all sets U that satifi 
UC~[4/S,4/(SV U)] 
on 1 AI. Thus it is the greatest unsupported set with respect to S and i. Moreover, G 
is definable by an induction that closes within w stages. 
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PROOF. By Fact C above, any unsupported set is contained in G. But G, being a 
tixpoint the formula, is itself an unsupported set. Closure within w follows from 
Fact B above. 0 
The greatest fixed point G above can be constructed in universe IAl for given 
(S, S> by induction, in the standard fashion: 
l U, = IMlk (for whatever the appropriate arity k is). 
l K+, = &q/S, s’/(S v U”>l. 
l u, = n, u,. 
This U, is the desired greatest unsupported set. The finite stages of the above 
construction_s can be captured by finitary formulas: x,,(x) = true, and x, + ,(x> = 
&J/s, G/U v x,)1. 
5.2. Well-Supported Set Axiom 
We now formulate an axiom to require that all unsupported sets are contained in 
corresponding tilde relations. This is the “commonsense” axiom that we believe 
captures the spirit of circumscription more accurately than the usual relation- 
minimization axioms. 
Definition 5.3. Let P be a given logic program with generic rule q(x) + 4(x>. The 
well-supported set axiom is 
wellsup( R, I?) dzfVU [ unsup(U,R,Z?) + (U~ti)] 
Observe that wellsup depends implicitly_ on P through unsup. 
Intuitively, for a “set of beliefs” (R, R) to be well-supported, any unsupported 
set U with respect to (R, R) must be contained in R. 
Certain relationships between the weflsup axiom and stable and well-founded 
models can be shown. These relationships apply to so-called “augmented” pro- 
grams as well as the original programs. A simple way to incorporate “unknown” 
objects is to form the augmented program [50]: 
Definition 5.4. Given a dualized set of rules (P,P), the associated augmented 
program is obtained by first adding the rule 
aug~fP#(g#(%#)) +P#(g&#)) 
to the program, where p#, g,, and a,, are new symbols, not in P. This produces 
a new functional vocabulary, L, = L, U {a,, gJ, with corresponding Clark 
equ_ality axioms, denoted as CEA#. Thus the augmented program is 
(P, P, aug, CEA#). Predicate p# is considered neither a positive nor a tilde 
predicate; it just functions as a “carrier” for g, and a,. Clearly it can always be 
interpreted as the empty relation. 
If domain closure (Definition 4.3) is to be used, it is defined with respect to 
L, and is denoted as dca#. 
Theorem 5.3. Let a dualized (possibly augmented) program be given, and append 
the domain closure axiom and the axiom wellsup(q, @). The logical consequences 
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of the resulting set of axioms, which is (P,@, CEA, wellsup(q, q), dca) (for the 
nonaugmented program) or (P, k, aug, CEA#, wellsup(q, q), dca#) (for the aug- 
mented program), agree with the well-founded dualized model in the sense that a 
ground atom is in the well-founded dualized model if and only if it is a logical 
consequence of the axioms. 
PROOF. The domain closure axiom allows us to restrict attention to Herbrand 
models. Suppose (R, R:) is the well-founded dualized model. By its definition [50, 
Section 31, R is the union of all sets U that are unfounded with respect to (R, R;>. 
By Lemma 5.1 all such U are unsupported, so the axiom wellsup(R, R) holds. Thus 
the well-founded dualized model is an upper bound on the set of atoms that are 
logical consequences. Let (S, S) be any Herbrand model that satisfies wellsupcq, q). 
Being a model, we-have +(S, ,!?> c S, and by the wellsup axiom U(S, $1 G s (recall 
Definition 5.2 for U and W). Thus (S,S) is a pre-lixpoint of W, so is a superset of 
the well-founded dualized model. 0 
Note that we did not append the disjointness axiom to the list of assumptions 
above. Just as was the case without the axiom wellsup, it is straightforward to show 
that, for any dualized program (P, k, CEA), with any combination of the axioms 
aug, dca, and wellsup (all expressed in appropriate vocabularies), the logical 
consequences are the same with or without the disjoint axiom. In each case, over 
any fixed universe, the set of consequences can be built up by transfinite induction, 
and it is routine to show that there can be no first step where disjoint is violated. 
However, this axiom, as well as total, is needed to obtain stable models. 
Theorem 5.4. Let a dualized (possibly augmented) program be given, and append the 
domain closure axiom, the totality axiom, the disjointness axiom, and the axiom 
wellsup(q, 4). The models of the resulting set of axioms, which is (P, P,CEA, 
disjoint, total, wellsup(q, q), dca) (for the nonaugmented program) or (P, P, aug, 
CEA#, disjoint, total, wellsup(q, q), dca#) (for the augmented program), are pre- 
cisely the stable models of the original (possibly augmented) program, with q 
corresponding to 7 q. 
PROOF. It is sufficient to prove that all models are fixpoints of W, and all fixpoints 
of W that satisfy totality and disjointness are models 150, Theorem 5.41. If (R, R) is 
a hxpoint of W, the wellsup axiom holds, as argued in the previous theorem. It 
easily follows that (R, R) is a model of the whole formula. 
Now suppose (R, I?) is a model, implying that +[q/R, q/R] c R. If UEfR - 
+[q/R, q/R] is nonempty, then we claim it is an unsupported set w.r.t. (R, R). By 
totality and disjointness, 6 is true just where 4 is false (and vice versa), so 
U c &q/R, q/R]. So Definition 5-l holds by monotonicity of 6, and the claim 
follows. Conseque-ntly, &q/R, q/R] = R (or_disjointness would be violated). Simi- 
larly, wellsup(R, R)_implies that U(R, R) c R. I,f it is a proper subset, there is a 
nonempty set S L R such that S c +[q/R, q/R] = R as well, again violating dis- 
jointness. So U( R, R) = d, and (R, R) is a fixpoint of W. 0 
One issue that arises with second-order axioms is whether countable models 
exist. In conjunction with dca and CEA, all models must be countable, as their 
universes are isomorphic copies of the Herbrand universe. However, one motive 
for taking the axiomatic approach was to get away from fixed universes. It is 
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noteworthy that wellsup has countable models in the sense given next, without the 
coercion of dca. 
Recall that J is an elementary submodel of an arbitrary infinite model J” if its 
universe I.41 is a subset of the universe of _4( and every first-order formula with k 
free variables is true in J% for tuple (m,, . . . , mk) E I.,&?lk if and only if it is true in 
JV for the same tuple. By the downward Liiwenheim-Skolem theorem, every 
infinite model Jf (over a finite or countable vocabulary) has a countable elementary 
submodel _J%. However, since wellsup(q, q) is stated in second-order logic, we 
cannot use that result to conclude immediately that, if a set of sentences including 
wellsupcq, q) has a model, it has a countable model. However, this property can be 
proved with the aid of Lemma 5.2 and the construction following it. 
Theorem 5.5. Let @I be a first-order sentence involving just the symbols of the program 
(P, P). Zf _N is any injmite model of (P, P, aug, CEA#, wellsup(q, $1) U {+!I}, and ~2’ 
is a countable elementary model of J”, then J is also a model of (P,P, aug, 
CEA#, wellsup(q, $1 U ($1. 
PROOF. Suppose JV is an infinite model of_ (P, P, aug, CEA#, wellsup(q, $1 U {J/I) 
with universe I/vi and interpretations (S, S> of (q, q>. Let J be a countable 
elementary submodel of Jy; with interpretations (R, i) of (q, 4). 
Since _& is an elementary submodel of JV, M is a model of the first-order 
axioms (P, P, aug, CEA#) U {I)}. So it remains only to prove that J is a model of 
wellsup(q, q>. 
To prove wellsu$R, l?> is satisfied, we must show that the greatest unsupported 
set GM w.r.t. (R, R), calculated in 4, is a subset of R, the interpretation of 4 in 
_&. Suppose not: some tuple x E (G,,, -l?); such an x cannot be in 9, as R = i 
restricted to &. Recall that G, is the intersection of the interpretations of the 
finitary first-order formulas x, given following Lemma 5.2. Since x E G,,,, every 
x,(x> is true in A’. Hence every x,(x) is also true in N, by the elemenfary 
submodel relationship, so x must be in the greatest unsupported set w.r.t. (S, S) in 
K But x e 3, so wellsup(q, q) in J is violated. Thus the assumption that G, C, 15 is 
inconsistent, so the theorem is proved. 0 
6. FINITE PRESENTATIONS 
Issues of finite axiomatization might seem like abstract theoretical points, but our 
study is motivated by quite practical considerations. If the semantics of a logic 
program can be stated with a finite vocabulary, that should be a great convenience 
for the development of compilers, interpreters, and automated verification tools. 
In this section we give alternative finite formulations of CEA and of Kunen’s 
semantics. To simplify the presentation, we sometimes assume that the program 
contains just one constant, II, one unary function symbol, g, and one binary 
function symbol f. This is without loss of generality, as larger vocabularies can be 
encoded with just the symbols a and f. 
6.1. Finite Presentation of C&l 
For a finite program, the global injectivity constraint can be stated finitely (see 
Definition 3.2). Only the acyclic&y constraint, which prevents a term being equal to 
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a proper subterm of itself, requires an infinite number of inequalities. However, an 
(essentially) equivalent constraint can be stated finitely in first-order logic, with the 
aid of an auxiliary predicate. Similar constructions have been used elsewhere in the 
logical literature. 
Definition 6.1. Let L be a given finite functional vocabulary. The following for- 
mula, denoted F,Cx, y), defines functional edges. For illustration, we assume L 
contains one unary function symbol g, one binary function symbol f, plus 
constant symbol a (constants do not affect this definition). The general case is 
the obvious extension, including k disjuncts for each k-ary function symbol of 
L. 
FL(x,y)*fy=g(x) V3z [y=f(x,z)] ‘.‘3Z [Y=f(V)l 
For functional vocabulary Lj, the associated formula is written Fj, to avoid 
double subscripts. 
In any structure for L with fixed interpretations of the symbols of L, the 
functional graph is the set of functional edges in the structure-that is, ordered 
pairs of elements (m,,m,> such that FL(m,,m,> is satisfied. (Because FL con- 
tains only the equality predicate, there is no need to distinguish between the 
formula and its interpretation.) 
For infinite vocabularies, the definition of FL becomes an infinite-length disjunc- 
tion. When we use FL in definitions of concepts, that is harmless. In other contexts, 
such as in the statement of the c-acyclic&y axioms below, it is possible to get an 
equivalent definition by replacing the one axiom involving FL with an infinite 
collection of (finite-length) axioms, one for each disjunct in the definition of FL 
above. 
Clearly, if F(t,, t,) holds, then t, is a proper subterm of t,. However, to identify 
all proper subterms of t,, transitivity is needed. 
Definition 6.2. Let c be a predicate symbol not occurring in the program. We 
shall use it as an infix binary predicate, with the intuitive meaning “is a proper 
subterm of.” Let L be a given functional vocabulary. Now the c-acyclicity 
constraint is given by a set of axioms in the following form: 
73x [xcx] 
the last two lines assert that c is transitive and antireflexive-that is, it is a 
strict partial order. Clearly, if term t, is formed by any finite number of function 
applications from term t, and other terms, then t, c t, must hold. 
Note that this definition depends implicitly on the vocabulary; when neces- 
sary, the intended vocabulary is made explicit in the discussion. However, 
subscripts to the “ c ” symbol denote more than this; see Definition 6.3. 
For an infinite vocabulary, an infinite set of axioms replaces the first line. 
A c-minimum model is one that interprets c by its minimum model. 
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Because the axioms for c can be written as Horn clauses (including one 
negative clause), they have the model intersection property. If they have any model 
in a given structure, they have a minimum model in that structure, namely, the 
transitive closure of the functional graph. The transitive closure is defined by the 
well-known least fixpoint, and every tuple in it is “derived” at some finite stage. 
Thus “ c-minimum” is well defined above. 
However, we do not in general require c to be interpreted by its least fixpoint; 
that would require a second-order axiom. It is sufficient for our purposes that any 
model contains the least fixpoint. For each such model, there is a “ c-minimum” 
model, which interprets all relations as in the original model except that it 
interprets c by its least lixpoint. Although the axioms do not restrict models to be 
C-minimum, certain properties of c-minimum models will be useful. 
Definition 6.3. Let J be a structure for vocabulary L and predicate symbol C, as 
well as the symbols of program P. The minimum relation satisfying Definition 
6.2 is denoted tL. To avoid double subscripting, for Li the minimum relation is 
denoted ci, rather than cL,. In particular, cp is associated with L, the 
vocabulary of the original program in question, [IJ# is associated with L,, c * 
is associated with L *, cl is associated with L,, etc. 
Lemma 6.1. Eve? model of the c-acyclicity constraint satisfies the acyclic@ con- 
straint of Definition 3.2. Moreover, any model (without a c relation) that satisfies 
that acyclicity constraint can be extended to a ” c-minimum” model. 
PROOF. (1) Start with a model satisfying the c-acyclic@ constraint. Clearly, the 
interpretation of c must contain the transitive closure of the functional graph 
(Definition 6.1). Now if any acyclicity axiom of Definition 3.2 (say, x f t(x)> were 
violated, it would produce a sequence of functional edges from the occurrence 
of x in t to the root of t that constitute a cycle. Thus x cx would be satisfied, 
contradicting the hypothesis. 
(2) The transitive closure of the functional edge relation satisfies the first two 
requirements for C. If there were a finite sequence of functional edges from any x 
to itself, we could read off a violation of the acyclic@ constraint of Definition 3.2 
from the cycle, so the transitive closure must be acyclic. Finally, as noted above, the 
transitive closure of the functional edge relation must be the minimal such c 
relation. q 
Therefore, whether CEA is interpreted to contain the original acyclic@ con- 
straint or the c-acyclicity constraint, the logical consequences of the program are 
not affected as far as symbols other than c are concerned. 
The axiom set CEA* used for the Kunen semantics has no finite presentation, 
as it covers an infinite set of symbols. We shall show that the Kunen semantics can 
nevertheless be finitely presented. 
6.2. Technical Lemmas 
As tools for demonstrating a finite presentation of Kunen’s semantics (Theorem 
6.71, we look briefly at the structure of models of CEA and an additional binary 
relation, + or C, on functional vocabularies that include all symbols of P and 
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possibly additional symbols. The relation + or c, written as an infix operator, 
helps to identify elements of the universe that are not built up from the functional 
vocabulary of P alone. Essentially, these elements will enable us to transform 
models on infinite vocabularies to models on finite vocabularies. We shall use x s y 
and x Roy as abbreviations for (x =y V x -c y) and (X = y V x c y), respectively. 
In particular, we shall use the symbol ci to indicate the transitive closure of the 
functional edge relation of vocabulary Li. We shall generally use < for intermedi- 
ate stages in the construction of such c relations. 
Definition 6.4. Let .d be a structure for functional vocabulary L, with universe 
I.,&[. Recall that cL denotes the minimum relation satisfying Definition 6.2 for 
L. 
Call x a c,-minimal element of I.&l if there is no z E I&J such that z C~ X. 
Note that these are just the elements that are not in the range of (the 
interpretations of) any function of L. 
An element of I_&( is called unnameable in L (or just unnameable when L is 
understood) if it is not in the range of (the interpretations of) any function or 
constant of L. 
Definition 6.5. Let L be any functional vocabulary. An expanding uocabulary for L 
is a countable (i.e., finite or countably infinite) vocabulary L, G? L which contains 
at least one function symbol (of positive arity) not in L. 
Note that, for any program P, L, (= L, U (a,, g#} per Definition 5.4) and L, 
(which consists of L, plus infinitely many new function symbols of each arity, 
including 0, per Section 4.2) are both expanding vocabularies for L,. 
The import of the above definition is that, if L, is an expanding vocabulary for 
L,, then the corresponding CEA, forces the existence of infinitely many objects 
not forced to exist by CEA. 
We conjecture that the definition of “expanding vocabulary” can be generalized 
to include the case where L, contains infinitely many constants not in L,, but no 
new functions. This case might be of interest to deductive database theory. 
However, the proof of Lemma 6.2 would break down, and this is needed for 
Lemma 6.5. Overcoming the technical difficulties appears to require advanced 
techniques of recursive function theory and recursively saturated models t.51, which 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Lemma 6.2. Let P be a logic program with vocabulary L,. Let L, be any expanding 
vocabulary for L,. Let &I be any model for (P, P, CEA,), with universe (Ml. For 
each constant symbol a or function symbol f of L,, let (a( or If I denote its 
interpretation in MI. Define cP as in Definition 6.3. 
1. For each a EL, -L,, (al is unnameable in L,. 
2. For each k-ary f E L, -L, and each k-tuple m of elements 1~1, If I(m) is 
unnameable in L,. 
3. Infinitely many elements of I.&( are unnameable in L,. 
4. Every element of [.A( that is unnameable in L, is c,minimal. 
PROOF. (l)-(3) are straightforward consequences of CEA,. For (4), by the fact that 
an element that is unnameable in L, cannot have a functional edge of Fp entering 
it, it is cFminimal. 0 
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We now introduce the notions of “weakly dominated by” and “dispersed 
minimal set,” which are purely technical tools for the proofs that follow. 
Definition 6.6. Let -C be any partial order on set S. Call x a <-minimal element of 
S if there is no z E S such that z <x. 
Let U and I/ be subsets of S. We say U is weakly dominated by V (under < > 
if, for each u E U, there is a UE I/ such that u & u. 
We call U a dispersed minimal set for < if U is a subset of <-minimal 
elements of S that is not weakly dominated under < by any finite subset of S. 
Observe that any dispersed minimal set must be infinite, because it is weakly 
dominated by itself. 
Lemma 6.3. Let P be a logic program with vocabulary L,. Let L, be an expanding 
language for L,. Let AI be any model for (P, P, CEA,), with universe I A?!. Define 
cP as in Definition 6.3. Let C = {m,, . . . , mk} be any nonempty finite subset of 
IAl. Then there is an element m’ E I&I such that the following hold: 
1. m’ is unnameable in L,; 
2. m’ is not the interpretation of any constant symbol in L,; 
3. m’ $r m, for any mi E C. 
Therefore, the subset of IAl that is unnameable in P is a dispersed minimal set for 
=P 
PROOF. Let c1 be the minimum c relation for L, (Definition 6.31, and let f be a 
function in L, -L,. For notational simplicity, we assume f is binary. Let If I be 
the interpretation of f. Let mj be a maximal element of C with respect to c1 
(which must exist since C is finite and nonempty). Set m’ = If I(mj, mj>. If m’ cP mi 
is true for any mi E C, then mj c1 mi, contradicting maximality. 
The subset of 1~~1 that is unnameable in P (call it U) is cpminimal by Lemma 
6.3. For any nonempty, finite C c 1.4, an m’ E U can be chosen as above to 
demonstrate that U is not weakly dominated by C. q 
Example 6.1. Let S be the set of all pairs (i, j>, (w, j), (i, w>, where i and j are 
natural numbers and w is the first infinite ordinal. Let (u, V) * (x, y) hold when 
u <x and u < y in the standard order. Then {CO, 2), (1, 1)) is weakly dominated by 
{(2,3)1 and KO,2), (1, l), (2, ON is weakly dominated by {(2,3), (2,O)l. 
Here <-minimal elements are those of the forms (0, x) and (x, 0). For U to be a 
dispersed minimal set, it must be the union of infinite subsets of both minimal 
forms; for example, if only a finite number of elements of the form (0, x) are in U, 
let the largest such finite x be less than the integer n [CO, w) may also be present]. 
But now U is weakly dominated by the finite set ((0, w), (w, n)}. 
Lemma 6.4. Let pi- 1 be a partial order on an infinite set S and let U._ , be a 
dispersed minimal set for pi_ P Let Ci_ 1 = (r,, . . . , r,J be a jmite subset of S. 
Suppose r E L._ , is such that r ii_, r, for all ri E Ci_ ,. Let +i be the transitive 
closure of <i_ 1 U ((rl < r-1,. . . , (rk -c r)). Let L.J be .!I,_, - (r-1. Then +i is a strict 
partial order on S, and U is a dispersed minimal set for +i. 
PROOF. First, we claim that *i is a strict partial order. It is transitive by definition. 
If there is a cycle s <i s for any s E S, it must involve an edge (ri < r) for some i. 
Follow the cycle from r over edges of <i_ 1 until it reaches some rj (possibly j = i) 
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such that the next edge in the cycle is (rj < r). This sequence of edges shows that 
I-X. 1_ 1 rj, contradicting the choice of i. Thus <i is also acyclic, proving the claim. 
Clearly, tJ is infinite and consists of <i_ i-minimal elements of S. All of these 
except r are also -Qminimal. 
Finally, suppose that q were weakly dominated under <i by some finite 
subset Ci. Then I!(_. 1 would be weakly dominated under +i_ 1 by (Cj u Ci_ i), 
contradicting the hypothesis of the lemma. q 
Exumple 6.2. Continuing Example 6.1, let -$ be < from that example, and let lJ, 
be the set of all elements of the form (0, x) or (x,0). Let C, = {(2,2)}. Then a 
possible choice of r is (0,3), which leads to x1 having the following new 
relationships: (2,2) < (0,3), (2,2) < (1, k), (2,2) < (2, k), for all k 2 4. 
6.3. Finite Presentation of Kunen Semantics 
We have considered two ways to add to the functional vocabulary of the program, 
finitely with CEA# and infinitely with CEA * . This section shows that models can 
be transformed between the two vocabularies without changing the interpretation 
of any symbol in P. While this seems quite plausible, there are technical difficulties 
due to the fact that the functional graph (Definition 6.2) need not be well-founded, 
so straightforward inductive constructions do not work. 
Recall that L, denotes the vocabulary of P with the additional constant a, and 
unary function g,, that CEA# is defined over this vocabulary, and that elements of 
a universe are called nameabZe in L, if they are in the range of (the interpretation 
of) some constant or function of L,. 
Lemm_a 6.5. Let $I be a first-order sentence involving just the symbols of the program 
(P, P). Let L, be the vocabulary of P, and let L, be that vocabulary augmented 
with constant a, and unaly function g,. Let_ L, be any expanding vocabulary 
for L,, and let CEA, be based on L,. If (P,P,CEA,)U{T I/I} has a model A1 
with universe 1.41, then (P, P, aug, CEA#) U { 7 $1 has a model. Further, if I&( is 
countable, the new model can be chosen so that it has the same universe, and every 
element of the universe is nameable in L,. 
PROOF. By the downward Lijwenheim-Skolem theorem, it suffices to restrict 
attention to countable models. We shall construct an interpretation lg#I for g, and 
form a new structure A# by discarding the interpretations of symbols in CEA, 
that are not in P, adding (a,1 and lg,I, interpreting p# as the empty relation, and 
leaying everything else as in .Mi. It follows immediately that _H# is a model of 
(P, P, aug> and 7 $. 
We shall construct the ranges of [a# I and lg#I to be exactly the set of elements 
of I_&1 that are unnameable in L,. Because CEA, is an expanding language for 
L,, that set is infinite. We shall also construct lg,l to be l-l; this will satisfy the 
global injectivity constraints of the CEA#. Finally, as we construct lg,I, we shall 
also construct a partial order C# which will show the acyclicity constraint of 
CEA# to be satisfied. 
Enumerate the elements of IAl as m,, m2,. . ., in any order. Let u,,,u1,u2, .. . 
be the subsequence of this sequence consisting of all elements of IdI that are 
unnameable in L,. (The interpretation of L, is retained from .Ni.> Choose u,, as 
the interpretation of a,. 
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Let U, be the set {u1,u2,. .}; we need to define Ig++l to be a l-l function from 
IL1 onto U,. Define -$ = cp (see Definition 6.3). We shall extend -$ to a new 
strict partial order C# that satisfies Definition 6.2 for L,, thereby showing that 
A# satisfies the acyclicity constraint of CEA#. 
We construct lg#l inductively, for stages LY ranging over the natural numbers, 
with different cases for (Y even and a odd. For stage 0, lgxl is totally undefined. 






U, consists of all elements of U,, which are not in the range 
Ig, I constructed by the end of stage (Y. 
<a is a strict partial order on 1 .Ll. 
U, is a dispersed minimal set for +a (see Definition 6.6). 
Forj<i<a, L$?IJ and <j L<~. 
For as many of the elements 
of the part of 
as are currently defined (where superscripts denote function composition), for 
all elements m E 1.M such that m -C~ Ig,l’(u,), either m = q, or m = Ig,l’(u,) 
for some j < i. 
For step 0, invariant 3 holds because 17, u {zq,} is dispersed minimal by Lemma 6.3 
and removing a finite number of elements leaves a dispersed minimal set. Also for 
step 0, invariant 4 holds because u0 is <,-minimal and Ig#l is totally undefined. 
The other invariants hold at step 0 vacuously or by construction. 
At stage a = 2n - 1: If Ig,Km,) is not already defined, define it as follows. Pick 
ui E U,,_ 2 of least index such that ui &,, _* m,; such a ui must exist since U,, p2 
is dispersed minimal. Set Ig#I(m,) = ui. Set U,,_ 1 = Uzn_2 - {ui) and <2n_ 1 to be 
the transitive closure of -$np2 U {m, -C ui}. (If lg,I(m,) was already defined, set 
U,,_, = U,,, _2 and +2n _1 = +2n _2.) Note that property 5 is trivially preserved 
under this definition. 
At stage a = 2n: If Ig,l~‘(u,> is not already defined, define u, to be the first of 
the following expressions which is currently undefined: 
Thus, for some i, Ig,l’(u,> = m’ is defined before stage 2n but Ig#I(m’) is not yet 
defined; define u, = Ig#I(m’). We need to show that u,,$~~~ 1 m’; if it were, then 
u, would already have been defined to be some Ig#l’(z+), and thus Ig,l-‘(u,) 
would already have been defined, contradicting the assumption. Set U,, = U,, _ 1 - 
b,J ad +,, to be the transitive closure of yznp 1 U {m’ < u,J. We need to 
show that it is still true that if some m -c2,, Ig++l’(u,), then for some k <j, m = 
Ig,l’?u,); this is routine. (If lg,l-‘(u,) was already defined, set U,, = U2n_, 
and ++, =+2n-1.) 
By Lemma 6.4, <a is a strict partial order on I_&\, and U, is a dispersed 
minimal set for <a. 
Let Ig#l and A# be constructed as shown. Now let c++ = U, < w(<ol). 
Then c# is a strict partial order and demonstrates that .M# satisfies the 
acyclicity constraints. 0 
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The differences between the previous lemma and the next are (1) the new 
vocabulary may be infinite and (2) the new model may contain unnameable 
elements. 
Lemma 6.6. Let I) be a first-order sentence involving just the symbols of the program 
(P,P). Let L, be the vocabulary of P, and let L, be that vocabulary augmented 
with constant a, and unary function g,. Let L, be any (at most countable) 
vocabulary containing at least L,, and let CEA, be based on L,. If 7 Cc, is 
consistent with (P, *, aug, CEA#) [that is, (P, P, aug, CEA#) U ( 1 I/J} has a model], 
then it is consistent with (P,k,CEA,). 
PROOF. By the downward Liiwenheim-Skolem theorem, it suffices to restrict 
attention to countable models. Let A# be a countable model of (P,@, aug, 
CEA#) U (7 t,b} with universe l&l. We shall define J%~ to be an interpretation of 
(P,P,CEA,) with the same universe and the same interpretations for the con- 
stants, functions, and predicates of (P,P) as A#. It follows immediately that AZ 
is a model of (P,P) U (7 I++}, regardless of the interpretations of functions and 
constants (if any) that do not appear in P. It remains to define interpretations of 
those symbols that appear only in CEA, in such a way that CEA, is satisfied. 
We define the interpretations of the functions appearing only in CEA,, not all 
at once, but one tuple at a time; that is, we shall build nested sequences of partial 
functions whose unions are functions as desired. Constants can be treated as O-at-y 
functions in this construction. 
Denote by g, j function symbols that appear in CEA, but not in P; let [g, j[ 
denote their interpretations in dz, which we shall specify. Enumerate in any order 
all *-expressions: “expressions” of the form lg * jJ(m,, . . . , mk), where each m, E I Al 
for 1 I n I k. Call these *-expressions ei, for i 2 1. Note that j, k, and m,, , . . , mk 
depend implicitly on i in this notation, and k may be 0. 
Define -$ = cp (see Definition 6.3), which is a strict partial order on l&l. Let 
U, be the set of elements of I I that are unnameable in L,. By Lemma 6.3, U, is 
a dispersed minimal set for -$,. For each expression ei we will pick a distinct 
element of U, to be its value. This will force all the constants and functions in 
CEA, to be l-l and to have disjoint ranges. 
We have left to ensure that AZ satisfies the acyclicity constraint of the Clark 
equality axioms. To do this, as we build the extension, we build (through stages -$ > 
the relation c2, as in Definition 6.2, which demonstrates that Mz satisfies the 
acyclicity constraints. The following invariants are maintained after each stage i of 
the construction: 
1. Values for e,, . . . , e, have been chosen. 
2. cp c <i, and +i is a partial order on 1 Al. 
3. q c U,,, and I!( is a dispersed minimal set for <i. 
They clearly hold for i = 0. 
For i > 0, suppose the invariants hold for i - 1. We need to assign a value to 
the *-expression ei = lg, jl(m,, . . . , m,). (Doing so will extend the current partial 
interpretation Ig, jl to include one more tuple in its domain.) Let C = (a, m,, . . . , 
mk}. Since q _ 1 is not weakly dominated under <i_ 1 by C, there is a <i_ ,-minimal 
element m’ E l,_ ,, where m’ #i_ 1 m,, for any m,, E C. Pick one such m’ as the 
value for e,; set <i to be the transitive closure of <i_l u {(ml + m’), . . .,(m, < 
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m’)) and set lJ to be lJ_, - {m’}. By Lemma 6.4, *i is a strict partial order on 
I&I, and y is a dispersed minimal set for *i. 
Let c2 =Uiz() -ci. It is routine to check that c2 is strict partial order and 
satisfies the criterion given in Definition 6.2 for the model AZ. Thus X2 satisfies 
the acyclic@ constraints and hence is a model of CEA,. 0 
Theore_m 6.7. Let 9 be a first-order sentence involving just the symbols of the program 
(P, PI. -Then $ is true in the Kunen semantics [that is, it is a logical consequence 
of (P, P, CEA * )I if and only if it is a logical consequence of the augmented pro- 
gram, (P,P,aug,CEA#). The conclusion also holds if CEA * and CEA# are 
replaced by any CEA, and CEA, for L, and L, being any two expanding 
vocabularies of L,. 
PROOF. The first part of the theorem follows from the contrapositive forms of the 
two preceding lemmas, instantiating L, and L, in turn to L,. The second part 
follows by transforming from L, through L, to L,, using the same lemmas. 0 
7. STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE DOMAIN 
In logic programming, the tradition of assuming the universe is a Herbrand 
model-usually the Herbrand model of the symbols in program-has become 
fairly well established. For definite clause programs this causes no loss of general- 
ity: an atom holds in all models of a definite clause program if and only if it holds 
in all Herbrand models of the program. But this equivalence breaks down for most 
semantics of nondefinite programs-and even the definitions of the semantics must 
often be generalized to cover non-Herbrand universes. 
It is interesting to observe that Theorems 5.3 and 5.4 of Section 5 use the 
domain closure axiom dca to ensure the connection between the logical conse- 
quences and the existing model-based definitions in the literature. Now dca at first 
seems to be unrelated to the commonsense and autoepistemic properties that the 
wellsup axiom is attempting to enforce, so it is natural to wonder if it is necessary 
or even desirable. Recall that Kunen’s semantics does not require such an axiom, 
yet it has both a logical and a computational formulation (Theorem 4.11, and the 
logical formulation can be finitely presented (Theorem 6.7). 
It is not always clear whether permitting or requiring the program to be 
interpreted in a universe with infinitely many “unknown” objects agrees with the 
user’s intentions. This question, called the universal query problem, is discussed by 
Przymusinska and Przymusinski [331. In the context of normal software, it seems 
clear that this is the right idea and that the domain closure axiom has no place. 
We want “procedures” to be as independent as possible of their environments. 
Certainly, we do not want their behavior to change when unrelated procedures, 
containing new symbols, are added to the software system. By assuming the 
existence of unknown objects, the semantics essentially “foresees” the addition of 
the new, unrelated symbols. 
In this section we investigate the impact of constraints on the domain of 
interpretation that go beyond CEA, but stop short of domain closure. First, we 
note that one weakened form of dca that has been proposed has no effect on 
augmented programs. Then we formulate a modified version of dca that seems to 
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be more natural for logic programs, which we call the domain foundation axiom, 
and show that it does have an effect. 
7.1. First-Order Approximation 
Maher has attributed to “folklore” the idea of using a first-order approximation to 
the domain closure axiom, which we shall call &a,. One of the important 
properties of Kunen’s semantics is that its axioms can be expressed in first-order 
logic, and dca, stays within this framework. Essentially, dca,, states that every 
element is nameable in L,, that is, it is in the range of the interpretation of some 
constant or function symbol of P, 
dcu, sfVx &[h/tme](n) 
where #+, is given by Definition 4.2. For the vocabulary of a, g, and f that we have 
been using, dcu, reduces to 
vx ((x=4 ” 3Y b=g(Y)l ” 3YZ b=f<rd) 
and thus says that every element of the universe either is the interpretation of 
constant symbol a or is in the range of the interpretation of one of the functions f 
or g. The variant dcu,# is defined analogously over the vocabulary that also 
includes a, and g,. 
The axiom dcu logically implies dcuf,, but the latter does not imply the former. 
In particular, dcu, p ermits models containing infinite descending chains (see 
Section 7.2), such as 
. ..) z-1 =g(z-2), =o =dz-l>, 21 =dzo), *2 =g(q),... 
that are disjoint from the Herbrand universe. However, dcu disallows such a model. 
Theore_m 7.1. Let Ic, be a first-order sentence involving just the symbols ,of the program 
(P, P). The $ is a logical consequence of the uupentedprogrum, (P, P, uug, CEA#), 
if and only if it is a logical consequence of (P, P, uug, CEA#, dcu,#). 
PROOF. The “if’ direction is trivial, and the “only if’ direction is a corollary of 
Lemma 6.5. 0 
Another variant is (P, P, uug, CEA#, dcu#). This can be shown to have different 
consequences, for appropriate P’s-both frpm (P, P, CEA, dcu), which is Fitting’s 
semantics (see Example 4.0, and from (P, P, uug, CEA#), which was shown to be 
the same as Kunen’s semantics. In the latter case, the import of dcu# is that it 
prevents infinite descending chains. This issue is discussed further in Section 7.2. 
7.2. Injinite Descending Chains 
On many augmented programs (perhaps most realistic ones), dcu does not affect 
the logical consequences. That is, (P, P, uug, CEA#, wellsup) has the same logical 
consequences with and without dcu. The next example shows that this is not true in 
all cases. The fundamental issue is whether a model can have “infinite descending 
chains,” as defined below. Without dcu such chains are possible. 
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Definition 7.2. Let (&I be a structure for the vocabulary L, which contains unary 
function g and binary function f. Let their interpretations be lgl and If I. An 
infinite descending chain is a sequence (z,,, zr, zr, . . .I of elements of l&l such 
that, for all natural numbers k: either zk = Ifl(z,+,, x) for some x E l&I, or 
Z,=IfI(X,Z,+l> for some XEI&l, Or Zk=Igl(Zk+r). (In a general vocabulary, 
the disjunction covers all functions and z k+ 1 appears in all of their argument 
positions. This definition also includes the case where there are an infinite 
number of function symbols, although that case cannot be stated by a finite- 
length formula in formal logic.) Note that the zk need not be distinct. 
Example 7.1. Consider the following program P, presented in the usual logic 
program notation: 
p(u) 
p(x) + -l q(x) 
q(s(y)) + 7 P(Y) 
n + q(x) 
Intuitively, p(x) is intended to mean that there is no infinite descending s-chain 
from x, while q(x) means the opposite. (The q rule may be read, “Term s(y) has 
an infinitely descending s-chain if y does not lack one.” Note that eliminating q 
would introduce a universal qualifier in the rule for p.) The dualized version, (P, @I>, 
is 
p(x) +x=u vq’(x) 
q(x) + 3 Y [x=4Y)W(Y)l 
n + 3xq(x) 
S(x) +x#u&q(x) 
Hx) + VY [x#s(y) VP(Y)1 
From (P, @, uug, CEA, wellsup(P, P), &a#) one can infer p(x) and g(x) for each x 
of the form sk(y), where y is not in the range of s and k 2 0 is a natural number. 
But, according to dcu#, all elements in the range of s are of that form; hence one 
can conclude ii. 
On the other hand, without dcu# the rest of the axioms have models in which ii 
is false. For example, let the domain consist of the Herbrand universe of the 
augmented program, together with Z, the integers (positive and negative). In Z, 
we interpret s as the usual integer successor, while in the Herbrand universe we 
interpret s “as itself.” Finally, we interpret p and Q to be true only in the 
Herbrand universe and interpret @ and q to be true in Z. Now ii may be false. 
Looking closely, we see that the axiom wellsup has no effect on this program, 
because none of the (original, normal) rules has a positive recursive subgoal. This 
phenomenon has been observed before [4_31 and can be seen by observing that the 
unsup axiom simplifies to U c @q/S], as 4 has no tilde atoms. But then &q/S] = s 
at any fixpoint, and wellsup is trivially satisfied. 
Thus this example makes the same point for semantics not based on we&up: 
Even applying domain closure axioms to an augmented vocabulary, which contains 
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additional functions not in P, can change the truth of sentences containing only 
symbols of P. 
7.3. Domain Foundation Axiom 
Having seen that dca# (the domain closure axiom) affects the logical conse- 
quences of augmented programs, even with wellsup present, it is natural to ask 
whether it is a “bug” or a “feature.” Rules might be interpreted in nonmonotonic 
logic in many contexts, so there is probably not one correct answer. 
In the context of logic programs, uninterpreted function symbols play the role of 
record constructors, and their names can often be thought of as data types. 
Conceptually, data structures must be constructed by computation; they have no 
independent existence (as do the integers). Therefore it seems reasonable to 
require that any data structure of a known type must be well-founded, that is, must 
not have any infinitely descending chains. 
However, it does not seem necessary or reasonable to require that the construc- 
tor can only be applied to objects currently in the program, for then the data type 
changes when the program changes. Reasoning about data types becomes difficult 
and of transient value at best in this case. 
With these observations as motivation, we propose a new axiom, which we call 
the domain foundation axiom (dfa), whose effect is to prevent infinite descending 
chains while permitting the universe to contain unnameable elements. 
Definition Z2. Again, assume the program has just a constant a, unary function g, 
and binary function f. Define 
4w(x>~f~Yz [(x=f(YG)) -+(w(YPw(z))l&~Y b=dY)) -W(Y)1 
(In general, there is a conjunction over all nonconstant function symbols of P.> 
Note that &,(x> is vacuously true if x is not in the range of f or g. 
Recall that the inductive closure of the rule w(x) + &,(x> is expressed by the 
second-order formula 
vx [w(x) - 4&x>] &VR [(4,&/R] CR> -+ (wcR)l 
The second-order part of the formula constrains w to be the least fixpoint of (the 
operator defined by) 4,. This leads to a domain foundation axiom, which effec- 
tively forces “known data types” to be well-founded. 
Definition 7.3. With 4, as defined in Definition 7.2, the domain foundation axiom 
is 
dfa%fVR [(&,,[w/R] CR) +VXR(X)] 
(Thus, like dca, this axiom can be stated formally only for a finite number of 
symbols.) We also denote this axiom by dfa# when it is defined over the 
augmented vocabulary L,. 
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Lemma 7.2. A structure for any vocabulary L satisfies dfa iff it has no infinite 
descending chains (see Definition 7.1). 
PROOF. To simplify notation, assume the functional vocabulary consists of just one 
unary function symbol g and one binary function symbol f. Suppose. that J is a 
model of CEA with an infinite descending chain (z,,, zi,. . . >. Let U be the least 
tixpoint of 4, (see Definition 7.2). The least fixed point U can be constructed by 
transfinite induction: 
for all ordinals (Y. Now by induction on (Y, no zi E U, . Thus no zi E U, contradicting 
dfa. 
Conversely, suppose _,#? is not a model of dfa. Let U be the least fixed point of 
4, (see Definition 7.2). So some element z,, = f(x, y) of 14 is not in U. Since 
z,, G U, x e U or y G U, pick z1 to be either x or y so that zi G U. Continue this 
way inductively, defining z, + , from z, as q was defined from q,. This produces 
an infinite descending chain. 0 
The domain foundation axiom subsumes the acyclicity constraint of CEA, as 
shown next. The converse is not true, as was shown by Example 7.1. 
Theorem 7.3. A structure that satisfies dfa must also satisfy the acyclic@ constraint of 
CEA. 
PROOF. If x = t is true, where T is a term containing X, then an infinite descending 
chain can be built by repeatedly traversing the term t (viewed as a tree) from its 
root to the place where x occurs. q 
Lemma 7.4. Suppose a structure _& for functional vocabulary L satisfies C&I. Then 
.k satishes dca if and on& if it satisfies dfa and dca,. 
PROOF. First suppose it satisfies dca. Then it must be an isomorphic copy of the 
Herbrand universe, and by construction the Herbrand universe satisfies dca, and 
has no descending chains. By Lemma 7.2 it satisfies dfa. 
Conversely, suppose J satisfies dfa and dca,. Since J satisfies CEA, an 
isomorphic copy Zof the Herbrand universe is a subset of IdI; the goal is to show 
that X is all of 1J1. Suppose x0 E I JJ -Z. Then x,, cannot be the interpretation 
of a constant (that would be in 8; so, by dca,, x,, = f(y, z) for some function 
symbol f and for some y, z. If both y, z EZ, then x,, ER, so either y +ZZor z P.Z. 
Set x, to be either y or z so that x, GZ?. Now repeat the construction, to get 
xq, x3,. . . . This is an infinite descending chain, contradicting Lemma 7.2. 0 
Analogous to Theorem 7.1 is Theorem 7.5, which clarifies to what extent 
the domain closure assumption affects the semantics discussed in this paper, 
in the presence of aug and CEA#. The proof uses the same ideas as the proof of 
Lemma 6.5. 
Theore_m 7.5. Let $ be a first-order sentence jnvolving just the symbols of the program 
(P, P). Then $ is true in all models of (P, P, aug, CEA#, wellsup(q, q), dfa#) if and 
only if I(, is true in all models of (P,k, aug, CEA#, wellsup(q, q), dca#). Also, +!I is 
true-in all models of (P, @, aug, CEA#, dfa#> if and only if rC, is true in all models of 
(P, P, aug, CEA#, dca#). 
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PROOF. The proofs of the two statements are essentially identical; we prove the 
first. The “if’ direction is now immediate by Lemma 7.4; For the “only if’ 
direction, we shall prove the contrapositive form: If (P, P, aug, CEA#, w&up 
(q, $, dfa#) u { 7 $1 has any model, then so does 
(P,P,aug,CEA#,wellsup(q,q),dcu#) U { 7 $1 
Suppose (P,P, uug, CEA#, wellsup(q, tj>, dfu#> U { T$} has a model _K Then by 
Theorem 5.5, (P, @, uug, CEA#, welhp(q, $1 U { 7 I)} has a countable elementary 
submodel &, with universe l&l. Moreover, & is a model of dfu#, since any 
infinite descending chain in .& would also be an infinite descending chain in Jy; 
contradicting dfu# in X 
By CEA#, infinitely many elements of I.,&( are in the ranges of the interpreta- 
tions of a, and g,, and hence are unnameable in L,. We shall discard the old 
interpretations of these augmentation symbols and construct new interpretations, 
Ia,1 and lg,I, that “cover” all unnameable (in LP) elements. Doing so causes 
dcu,# to be satisfied, that is, it makes all elements of (AI become nameable 
in L,. 
In the new model, all other symbols will be interpreted as in &, it will be 
necessary only to make sure that (CEA#, dfu#, dcu#) is satisfied. 
Since I_&) contains no infinite descending chains, for each m in _& there are 
only finitely many m’ in &, where m’ cP m (by K&Jig’s theorem on finitely 
branching trees). Hence an enumeration m,, m2,. . . of I.,81 can be chosen so that 
if mi cP mj (see Definition 6.3), then i <j. That is, cp respects subscript order. 
As in Lemma 6.5, let u,,, u,,z.+,. . . be the subsequence of m,,m,,. . . consisting 
of elements that are unnameable in L,. Thus ui = mj for some j L i. Now sim- 
ply define Ia,1 =J+, and Ig,Km,> =u,, for n 2 1. Beginning with the partial 
order < = cp and adding the relationships m, -C u, maintains the property 
that < respects subscript order. It follows easily that the transitive closure of < is 
a partial order and has no infinitely descending chains, so dfu# is satisfied. By 
construction, the global injectivity part of CEA# is satisfied and all of 1~1 is 
nameable in L,, so dcu,# is satisfied. By Lemma 7.4, dcu# is satisfied. 0 
8. CONCLUSION 
We have addressed two primary issues in this paper. First, using the tool of the 
dualized program, we have provided what we feel is a more natural axiomatization 
of the well-founded and stable semantics. In addition, we have presented finite 
(albeit sometimes econd-order) axiomatizations for several other semantics. 
Second, as we noted, the restriction to Herbrand universes in logic programming 
is becoming suspect. We have examined various weakenings of that restriction, 
dcu#, dfu, and dcu,. We have compared the formulations of program-completion, 
stable, and well-founded semantics under differing domain axioms. The rela- 
tionships are illustrated in Figure 1. Again, we have also provided finite (albeit 
sometimes second-order) axiomatizations of domain assumptions. In particular, 
dfu, proposed here, seems to merit consideration as the proper domain assumption 
for logic programming. 
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8.1. Future Work 
The natural (and open) questions concern variations of well-founded and stable 






What sort of semantics are given by the logical consequences of the dualized 
program plus weh!sup(q,$ without the additional restriction enforced by 
dca or dfu? In most practical cases, we expect this to be the same as the 
well-founded semantics. 
Removal of the acyclicity constraint is another possibility, which has been 
extensively studied, but not in conjunction with wellsup(q, 4). 
The corresponding questions about stable semantics. 
In general, semantics with second-order axioms are not recursively enumer- 
able. Can reasonable classes of programs be identified that allow the second- 
order axiom to be replaced by a first-order axiom, and thereby drop the 
complexity to r.e.? This question has been studied in connection with tradi- 
tional circumscription [22, 18, 171. A major goal of logic programming is to 
write programs for computer generation of inferences, and only when the set 
of inferences is r.e. can all inferences be generated. 
Procedurally, it seems necessary to label atoms “undefined” in the course of 
query answering in the well-founded semantics [38]. Should the language of 
logic programming be extended to allow the user to state undefined(p(x)) 
explicitly as a goal? 
This attempt o express logic programming semantics in terms of classical ogic was motivated by Robert 
Kowalski’s expressed reservations about nonstandard logics and procedural definitions. (However, he 
has in no way endorsed this effort.) Discussions with Phokion Kolaitis have been helpful to the authors. 
The anonymous referees made many helpful comments and many suggestions to improve the presenta- 
tion of the paper. The first author’s research was supported in part by NSF Grants CCR-89-58590 and 
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